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COMMENTS
MORRISON-KNUDSEN CO. v. CHG
INTERNATIONAL, INC.: DOES JUDICIAL
ADJUDICATION RESTRAIN THE
FSLIC AS RECEIVER?
Federal statutes authorize the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
to appoint the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) as
receiver or conservator to take control of the assets and operations of insol-
vent or mismanaged savings and loan associations.' The FSLIC as receiver2
has a broad range of powers at its disposal to effect the association's reorgan-
ization, its merger with another insured association, or its liquidation.3 One
of the most important and disputed powers of the FSLIC as receiver derives
from section 406(d)4 of the National Housing Act (NHA),5 where Congress
1. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5(d)(6)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (Supp. IV
1986) [hereinafter HOLA]. Congress also authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) to appoint the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) as receiver
of a state savings and loan association upon finding that grounds exist for the appointment of
the FSLIC as receiver of a federal thrift and upon completion of specific procedural require-
ments. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 406(c)(2), 48 Stat. 1246, 1260 (1934) (as
amended by the Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-389, § 6, 82 Stat. 295 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter NHA]; see also infra
note 4. State authorities may also appoint and regulate the FSLIC as receiver of state thrifts
under state law. See Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-389, § 6, 82 Stat. 294, 295
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also infra note 4.
2. The phrase "FSLIC as receiver" is a term of art used to distinguish the receiver from
the FSLIC in its corporate capacity. See 12 C.F.R. § 569a.5 (1987). Although this Comment
will often use the terms "receiver" or "FSLIC," the reader should understand the meaning to
be "FSLIC as receiver."
3. See NHA, § 406(a)-(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1729(a)-(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also 12
C.F.R. § 549.3 (1987) (powers of receiver over federally chartered thrift); id. § 569a.6 (powers
of receiver over state chartered thrift).
4. In 1982, § 122(d) of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,
amended § 406(c) of the NHA, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1482 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter Garn-St Germain Act]. This
provision enhanced the FHLBB's powers to appoint the FSLIC as receiver in the absence of
state action and subjected the FSLIC as receiver to the exclusive authority of the FHLBB in all
circumstances. Id. The amended language, however, expired on October 13, 1986, due to a
sunset provision contained § 141(a)(6) of the Garn-St Germain Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)
(Supp. IV 1986). After October 13, 1986, the language of§ 406 of the NHA, 12 U.S.C. § 1729
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), reverted to the language existing prior to the amendment. Conse-
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granted the receiver the power to settle or compromise claims against the
association.
To effectuate settlement and compromise, the FSLIC as receiver evaluates
the claims against an insolvent association and rejects those which are un-
substantiated.6 Some creditors have challenged the FSLIC's determinations
in court,7 while others have sought to bypass the FSLIC entirely by filing
court suits prior to presenting their claims to the FSLIC as receiver.' In the
mid 1980's, the FSLIC began to challenge court jurisdiction to hear creditor
claims9 under section 5(d)(6)(C) of the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA)1°
which states that courts may not "restrain or affect the exercise of powers or
functions of a conservator or receiver" except at the instance of the
quently, the FHLBB now may only regulate the FSLIC as receiver when appointed by the
FHLBB. See NHA, Pub. L. No. 73-479 § 406, 48 Stat. 1246, 1259-60 (1934) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
Between 1982 and 1986, when most cases construing § 406(d) were decided, § 406(d) pro-
vided: "In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions, the [FSLIC] shall have
power ... to settle, compromise or release claims in favor of or against the insured institution,
and do all things that may be necessary in connection therewith, subject only to the regulation
of the [FHLBB]." 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (emphasis added). The last
clause of this passage now reads: "subject only to the regulation of the court or other public
authority having jurisdiction over the matter." NHA, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 406(d), 48 Stat.
1246, 1259-60 (1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986))
(emphasis added). The effect of the expiration of this provision is minimized by the language
of § 406(c)(3) which provides that "court or other public authority" means the FHLBB when
the FHLBB appoints the FSLIC as receiver. See Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
389, § 6, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
5. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-50 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The NHA contains provisions creat-
ing the FSLIC and defining the powers and functions of the FSLIC. See id. §§ 1729-1730g
(1982 & Supp IV 1986). Section 1729 authorizes the FSLIC to serve as receiver for the liqui-
dation of insolvent savings and loan associations and broadly defines the powers and functions
the FSLIC maintains in this capacity. NHA, Pub. L. No. 73-479 § 406, 48 Stat. 1246, 1259-60
(1934) (codified as amended by the Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-389, § 6, 82
Stat. 249, 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
6. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b), (d) (1987) (the FSLIC as receiver of a federally chartered thrift
shall pay all claims allowed by it or approved by the FHLBB); id. § 569a.8(b), (d) (the FSLIC
as receiver for state chartered thrift shall pay all claims allowed by it or approved by the
FHLBB); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1)(B) (1982) (the FSLIC "shall pay all valid credit
obligations of the association").
7. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cert.
filed sub nor. Zohdi v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 5, 1987) (No. 87-255).
8. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Florida 100 Dev. Group, 670 F. Supp. 1579, 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
9. See, e.g., North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); see also infra notes 64-71.
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). The full text of § 5(d)(6)(C) provides: "Except as
otherwise provided in this subsection, no court may take any action for or toward the removal
of any conservator or receiver, or, except at the instance of the [FHLBB], restrain or affect the
exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or receiver." Id.
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FHLBB. 11
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit accepted the
FSLIC's argument in North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association v. Hud-
speth. 12 The court of appeals held that courts lack subject matter jurisdic-
tion to hear creditor claims against insolvent institutions prior to the
exhaustion of administrative remedies."3 Affirming the lower court's dismis-
sal, the Fifth Circuit held that only the FHLBB may regulate the actions of
the receiver.14 The court also concluded that initial jurisdiction over the
receiver lies exclusively with the FHLBB. 5 The Fifth Circuit noted that
Congress intended to permit the FSLIC to perform its statutory functions
quickly and decisively without interference from the judiciary or regulatory
authorities other than the FHLBB."6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, re-
jected the Hudspeth decision as logically flawed 17 and contrary to the true
11. Id.
12. 756 F.2d 1096, 1103 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
13. See id. The regulations governing FSLIC receiverships require creditors to present
their claims to the FSLIC within 90 days after the FSLIC first publishes notice to the associa-
tion's creditors. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4(a), 569a.8(a) (1987). The FSLIC will allow any claim
submitted within the period and proved to its satisfaction. Id. §§ 549.4(b), 569a.8(b). In the
event the FSLIC as receiver disallows a claim, the creditor, nevertheless, may request payment
within 30 days of the disallowance. Id. § 549.4(b). The FSLIC as receiver shall submit to the
FHLBB a complete list denoting the claims presented and the FSLIC's initial determination.
Id. §§ 549.4(c), 569a.8(c)-(d). The FHLBB will direct the FSLIC to pay any claims that the
FSLIC allowed or that the FHLBB approved. Id. §§ 549.4(d), 569a.8(d).
In 1985, the FHLBB proposed new regulations governing FSLIC receivership powers and
claim procedures. Conservators and Receivers Proposed Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970 (1985) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 547-549, 563, 569a-569c (proposed Nov. 8, 1985)). These rules
define in greater detail the procedures a claimant must follow prior to seeking judicial review
of the receiver's determination. Id. at 48,992-95 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.7-.9).
Under the proposed rules, the claimant must appeal the receiver's initial determination to the
director of the FSLIC to preserve the right of judicial review. Id. at 48,994 (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. § 569c.9(a)). The appeal to the director of the FSLIC will be based on the record
established by the receiver; however, a claimant also may submit a separate statement includ-
ing facts not considered in the initial determination. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 569c.9(a)( 3)).
14. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2530, 2539.
17. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1216 (9th Cir. 1987), peti-
tion for cert. filed sub norn FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3429 (U.S. Sept. 17,
1987) (No. 87-451). The Morrison-Knudsen court could not comprehend how initial adjudica-
tion of claims would delay the liquidation process given that claimants who seek judicial re-
view of the final agency action also could delay the liquidation process by years. Id.; see also
infra text accompanying notes 199-206.
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intent of Congress.18 In Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International, Inc. 19
the Ninth Circuit concluded that judicial resolution of creditor claims does
not interfere with the FSLIC's receivership duties because the powers
granted by Congress to the FSLIC as receiver do not include the power to
adjudicate creditor claims.2° Rather, the Ninth Circuit held that courts
must exercise discretion to determine whether claimants should exhaust
their administrative remedies prior to pursuing judicial remedies.21 The
court concluded that in the absence of statutory authority to adjudicate
creditor claims, the FSLIC as receiver could not rely on the HOLA 22 to
strip the court of jurisdiction.23
Several district courts outside of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have ad-
dressed this issue since the Morrison-Knudsen opinion. The majority of
these district courts adopted the Hudspeth analysis rather than the Morrison-
Knudsen rationale.24
This Comment will analyze the two primary judicial pronouncements on
FSLIC receivership power. First, the Comment will examine the develop-
ment of the Hudspeth approach to the FSLIC and review the Morrison-
18. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217.
19. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nor. FSLIC v. Stevenson
Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451).
20. Id. at 1217.
21. Id. at 1223. The Ninth Circuit explained that the judicially created doctrine requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not limit jurisdiction but rather encourages effi-
cient use of judicial resources by referring cases to the proper administrative agency. Id. (cit-
ing Wong v. Department of State, 789 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Morrison-
Knudsen court would require the claimant to first present the claim to exhaust his administra-
tive remedies by presenting his claim to the receiver for an initial determination of the claim's
merits. See supra note 13. The presentation process provides the receiver with an opportunity
to decide whether to negotiate a settlement to the claim or to deny the claim and defend its
determination in a de novo review before the court. See Homestead Say. v. Life Say. of Am.,
No. 86 C 20,268, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1987).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982); see also supra note 10.
23. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222.
24. Six courts adopted the Hudspeth approach: FSLIC v. Florida 100 Dev. Group, 670 F.
Supp. 1577, 1582, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1987); FirstSouth v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, No. 86 C 10,247
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC,
663 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Rigali v. Life Say. & Loan Ass'n of Am., No. 87 C
2543 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Acquisition Corp. of Am. v.
Sunrise Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138, 140 (S.D. Fla. 1987); FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 658
F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Utah 1987).
Two courts adopted the Morrison-Knudsen approach: Homestead Say. v. Life Sav. of Am.,
No. 86 C 20,268, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1987); FSLIC v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., No.
C86-0423G (D. Utah Apr. 24, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
One court declined to adopt either approach but refused to dismiss a claim against the failed
thrift on the grounds that the claims represented an admixture of prereceivership and post-
receivership activities requiring judicial resolution. See Peninsula Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 506, 508-11 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
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Knudsen response. Then, the Comment will analyze the statutory provisions
in light of the legislative history behind the amendments to the HOLA and
the NHA. This Comment will also address some of the constitutional impli-
cations that the Hudspeth approach raises. The Comment will conclude that
the interpretation of the Hudspeth court, requiring claimants to exhaust
their administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review, more closely
adheres to congressional intent to preserve the financial integrity of the
FSLIC.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL DEFENSE TO
CREDITOR CLAIMS
A. Pre-Hudspeth Adjudications of Creditor Claims
When the FHLBB appoints the FSLIC as receiver for either state
chartered thrifts25 or for federal thrifts26 the provisions of section 5(d)(6) of
the HOLA27 expand the FHLBB's authority over the receivership.28 The
first judicial interpretations of section 5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA primarily in-
volved the jurisdiction of the courts to challenge the power of the FHLBB to
appoint the FSLIC as receiver for a state chartered thrift.29
25. Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-389, § 6, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also supra note 4.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
27. Id. § 1464(d)(6) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 5(d)(6) established the FHLBB's
jurisdiction over the appointment and regulation of receivers for federal thrifts. Id. Section
406(c)(3)(A) of the NHA, amended by the Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-389,
§ 6, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)),
applies the provisions of § 5(d)(6) of the HOLA to FSLIC receiverships of state chartered
associations. Id.; see also supra note 4.
28. Congress expanded the FHLBB's authority to regulate failed state chartered thrifts in
two acts. The Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729(c), 1851-1884 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), granted the FHLBB
exclusive power to appoint the FSLIC as receiver of a state chartered thrift under certain
circumstances not relevant for purposes of this Comment. Id. § 1729(c)(2). The Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), further liberalized the procedures for the
FHLBB's appointment of the FSLIC as receiver of state chartered thrifts. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729(c)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also supra note 4.
When the state appoints the FSLIC as receiver of a state chartered thrift and the FHLBB
declines to federalize the appointment pursuant to its authority under § 406(c) of the NHA,
state law, rather than federal law, defines and regulates the receivership's powers and func-
tions. See Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-389, § 6, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). For examples of the application
of state law to FSLIC receiverships, see Hancock Fin. Corp. v. FSLIC, 492 F.2d 1325, 1327
(9th Cir. 1974) and Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 489 F.2d 829, 837 (7th Cir. 1973).
29. See First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. 988, 994-96
(D. Haw. 1982); First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. 251,
253 (D. Haw. 1981).
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In First Savings & Loan Association v. First Federal Savings & Loan Associ-
ation,3° a former state chartered savings and loan association sued the
FSLIC and the purchaser of the association's assets alleging conspiracy to
place the association in receivership. 3 ' The court held that the plaintiffs
could not challenge the appointment of the receiver because the plaintiffs
failed to name the FHLBB as a defendant.32 Because Congress had granted
the FHLBB exclusive jurisdiction to appoint the receiver, 33 the court rea-
soned that it could not remove the receiver without the FHLBB as a party in
interest. 4
The plaintiffs also requested injunctive relief to restore the association's
assets.35 The court determined that judicial restriction of the sale of receiv-
ership assets would interfere with the FSLIC's duties as receiver and, there-
fore, violate section 5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA.36 Interpreting the language of
section 5(d)(6)(C), which states that the court shall not interfere with the
actions of the receiver except at the instance of the FHLBB 37 the court
stated that the power to invoke the court's jurisdiction to insure proper exe-
cution of the receivership lies exclusively with the FHLBB.3 ' According to
the court, an affected individual must seek initial redress for his grievance
from the FHLBB.39 The claimant, thereafter, may seek judicial review of
the FHLBB's disposition under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).'
The plaintiff later refiled the case naming the FHLBB as an additional
defendant.4 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
30. 531 F. Supp. 251 (D. Haw. 1981).
31. Id. at 252.
32. Id. at 253.
33. The court erroneously noted that the FHLBB appointed the FSLIC as receiver of
First Savings & Loan Association pursuant to its authority under § 5(d)(6)(A) of the HOLA,
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). See First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. at 253.
The appointment of the FSLIC as receiver of a state chartered thrift falls within the purview of
§ 406(c) of the NHA. See Bank Protection Act of 1968, § 6, 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(2) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
34. First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. at 253.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 253-54.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
38. First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. at 254 n.4.
39. Id. at 254.
40. Id. The judicial review under Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter APA], provides that federal courts may review final
agency actions upon the whole agency record. Id. § 706. The court will sustain an agency's
factual findings unless unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. Otherwise, the court will
confine its review to matters of law. Id.
41. First Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. 988, 991 (D.
Haw. 1982).
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matter jurisdiction based upon section 5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA,4 2 and be-
cause the statute of limitations had expired for challenging the appointment
of the FSLIC as receiver.43 Using strong language, the court indicated that
the statute provides that no court could entertain an action challenging the
exercise of the powers and functions of the FSLIC as receiver.'
These cases established that section 5(d)(6)(C) imposes a jurisdictional
limitation on the courts' ability to entertain challenges to the FSLIC as re-
ceiver. The First Savings cases, however, involved an insolvent association
challenging the appointment and actions of the FSLIC as receiver.45 Thus,
the question of whether creditors' claims required a similar disposition re-
mained unanswered.
B. North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association v. Hudspeth
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied
the First Savings interpretation of section 5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA in its dis-
missal of a creditor claim.46 In North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association
v. Hudspeth,47 the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a credi-
tor's suit against an insolvent thrift in FSLIC receivership prior to the claim-
ant's exhaustion of administrative remedies.4 8
Hudspeth arose from a disputed deferred-compensation agreement be-
tween North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association (North) and Hud-
speth, a former president of the association.4 9 In 1982, North sought a
declaratory judgment to terminate the agreement and Hudspeth counter-
claimed for specific performance and breach of contract.5" The FHLBB sub-
sequently appointed the FSLIC as receiver for North.5" The FSLIC as
receiver removed Hudspeth's counterclaim to federal district court and
moved the court to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of subject matter juris-
42. Id. at 994.
43. Id. at 995; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A).
44. First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. at 994. "[It can be said without any fear of
dispute that Section 1464(d)(6)(C) of Title 12... makes it absolutely clear that no suit can be
entertained and no relief affecting the powers and functions of a receiver may be sought or
accorded . I..." Id  (emphasis added). The court's opinion never addressed the issue of judi-
cial review of administrative action or the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
45. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. 251, 252-53 (D.
Haw. 1981).
46. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1103 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); see also supra note 10.
47. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1096.
48. Id. at 1099.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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diction.52 The district court, relying on section 406(d) of the NHA5 3 and
section 5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA 54 held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case because adjudicating the claim would "restrain or affect" the powers of
the receiver.
55
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FHLBB, rather than the
courts, maintained exclusive jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the con-
duct of the receiver.16 The Fifth Circuit cited the legislative history of the
Bank Protection Act of 1968 (BPA) 7 to support its conclusion that courts
lacked jurisdiction. 8 The court reasoned that Congress intended the FSLIC
to act "quickly and decisively" to liquidate insolvent thrifts.59 Conse-
quently, any judicial resolution on the merits would delay the distribution of
the assets of the receivership.'
The Fifth Circuit approached the issue from the perspective of primary
jurisdiction. The court relied on section 406(d) of the NHA, which granted
the FHLBB exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the FSLIC as receiver, and
concluded that the FSLIC derived its power to adjudicate claims from
FHLBB regulations. 61 The court, therefore, did not analyze the scope of the
receiver's powers and functions to determine whether judicial adjudications
actually would interfere with the exercise of such powers and functions.
The Hudspeth decision requires, as a prerequisite for judicial review, that
creditors submit their claims against a failed thrift to the receiver for an
initial determination of whether the receiver will pay, settle, or disallow the
claim. 62 Pursuant to FHLBB regulations, the FSLIC as receiver must sub-
mit all disputed claims to the FHLBB for approval or reversal.63 The claim-
ant may seek judicial review of the FSLIC's determination only upon
exhausting these administrative procedures.64
52. Id. at 1100.
53. Id. at 1101 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982)); see also supra note 4.
54. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982)).
55. See id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982)).
56. Id.
57. Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729(c), 1881-
1884 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
58. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101. The Senate report from the Committee on Banking and
Currency stated that the FHLBB would maintain exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of
the FSLIC as receiver. S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2539.
59. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101.
60. Id. at 1102.
61. Id. at 1101-02 & n.5; see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4, 569a.8 (1987)).
62. See 756 F.2d at 1102; see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4(b), 569a.8(b) (1987).
63. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4(d), 569a.8(d) (1987); see also supra note 13.
64. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1103. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the Hudspeth decision in
several subsequent opinions. See, e.g., Red Fox Indus. v. FSLIC, 832 F.2d 340, 341-42 (5th
[Vol. 37:511
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Numerous district courts within the Third,65 Fourth,66 Seventh,67
Eighth,68 Ninth,69 Tenth,7" and Eleventh71 Circuits have adopted the Hud-
speth holding. Most of these decisions fail, however, to further explain the
Fifth Circuit's rationale. Instead, the early decisions routinely adopt the
Hudspeth decision due to the lack of contrary precedent. The majority of
Cir. 1987); Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth Fed. Ass'n, 829 F.2d 563, 564 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W.
3601 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (No. 87-996); FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391, 1393 (5th Cir.
1987), petition for cert. filed sub nor. Zohdi v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 5, 1987)
(No. 87-255); Godwin v. FSLIC, 806 F.2d 1290, 1292 (5th Cir. 1987); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC,
790 F.2d 1269, 1270 (5th Cir. 1986). None of these opinions expand upon the substantive
analysis of the Hudspeth decision. Numerous district courts in the Fifth Circuit have followed
the Hudspeth precedent. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Serpas, No. 87-0973 (E.D. La. Oct. 27, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); FSLIC v. Hickey, No. 86-3091 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); FSLIC v. Villard, No. WC 86-5 1-S-D (N.D. Miss. Jan. 15,
1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Quackenbush v. Audubon Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
No. 86-2470 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); FSLIC v. Hall Whis-
pertree Assocs., 653 F. Supp. 148, 150 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v.
FSLIC, No. 3-85-1709-R (N.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
65. See York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
66. See FSLIC v. Quality Inns, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 918, 922 (D. Md. 1987).
67. See FirstSouth v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, No. 86 C 10,247 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Rigali v. Life Say. & Loan Ass'n of Am., No. 87 C 2543
(N.D. Il1. June 16, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Baskes v. FSLIC, 649 F. Supp.
1358, 1365 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Politser v. Rosch, No. 86 C 0776 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636
F. Supp. 576, 580 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987). But see Homestead
Say. v. Life Say. of Am., No. 86 C 20,268, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1987) (adopting the
Morrison-Knudsen opinion).
68. See First Fin. Sav. & Loan v. FSLIC, Nos. LR-C-86-724, LR-C-86-725 (E.D. Ark.
Jan. 21, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
69. See Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D. Mont. 1987); Baer v. Abel, 649 F.
Supp. 25, 26 (W.D. Wash. 1986); Baer v. Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69, 73 (W.D. Wash. 1986);
Colony First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 643 F. Supp. 410, 415 (C.D. Cal. 1986); First
Am. Sav. Bank v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93, 96 (W.D. Wash. 1986);
Rembold v. Gibralter Say. & Loan Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 1006, 1007 (W.D. Wash. 1985), rev'd
sub nom Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987),petition for
cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No.
87-451); Murdock-SC Assocs. v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 948, 954
(C.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd, 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v.
Murdock-SC Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-452).
70. See FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 658 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Utah 1987). But see FSLIC v.
Provo Excelsior Ltd., No. C86-0423G (D. Utah Apr. 24, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) (adopting the Morrison-Knudsen opinion).
71. FSLIC v. Florida 100 Dev. Group, 670 F. Supp. 1577, 1582-83 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Ac-
quisition Corp. of Am. v. Sunrise Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138, 140 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
Sunrise Say. & Loan Ass'n v. LIR Dev. Co., 641 F. Supp. 744, 746 (S.D. Fla. 1986). But see
Peninsula Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 506, 511 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (distin-
guishing both Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen because claims represented admixture of pre-
receivership and postreceivership claims.)
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the later opinions, having a choice of competing rationales, adopted the
Hudspeth decision as well.
In 1986, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington offered one of the few opinions to expound upon the Hudspeth
rationale. In Baer v. Abel,72 shareholders of Westside Federal Savings &
Loan Association (Westside) brought a suit against Westside for violation of
state and federal securities laws, the federal Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO),7 3 and consumer protection laws.74 Shortly
thereafter, the FHLBB appointed the FSLIC as receiver for Westside. 75 The
FSLIC as receiver moved the district court to dismiss the suit on the
grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with its powers and
functions as receiver. 76 The court adopted the Hudspeth holding and dis-
missed the complaint.7 7 In its analysis, the court addressed several statutory
and constitutional challenges to the FSLIC's authority to adjudicate claims
against the insolvent thrift.78
The Baer court reasoned that section 406(d) of the NHA 79 subjects the
FSLIC as receiver to the exclusive regulation of the FHLBB.8 ° The regula-
tions established by the FHLBB require creditors to submit their claims to
the receiver for initial determination.8 ' The receiver then allows all claims
proved to its satisfaction. 2 However, the FHLBB, upon a showing of cause,
may approve claims the receiver disallowed. 3
The court held that the plain meaning of these regulations requires claim-
ants to present their claims to the receiver and appeal adverse decisions to
the FHLBB prior to seeking judicial resolution of their claims.8 4 According
to the court, the regulations establish an administrative procedure for adju-
dicating creditor claims which constitutes a power or function of the receiver
72. 648 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
73. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
74. Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 71.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 71-72.
77. Id. at 77.
78. Id. at 72-78.
79. Id. at 73 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also supra note 4.
80. 648 F. Supp. at 73.
81. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4(a), 569a.8(a) (1987).
82. Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 73 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b) (1987)); see also Conservators
and Receivers Proposed Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970, 48,992 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 569c.7) (proposed Nov. 8, 1985); supra note 13 (discussing proposed rule).
83. See Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 73 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(d) (1987)). Conservators and
Receiver Proposed Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970, 48,994 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 569c.9) (proposed Nov. 8, 1985).
84. Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 73.
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within the meaning of section 5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA. 85 Because section
5(d)(6)(C) precludes judicial interference with the powers and functions of
the receiver, the court reasoned that claimants must exhaust their regulatory
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. 86
The Baer court also addressed several statutory and constitutional chal-
lenges to the FSLIC's claims procedures. The plaintiffs in Baer asserted that
section 407(k)(1) of the NHA expressly established federal court jurisdiction
over claims against FSLIC receiverships. 87 For several reasons, the Baer
court rejected the argument that section 407(k)(1) demonstrated Congress'
intention that the FSLIC defend creditor claims in court. First, the court
held that this provision merely established whether judicial review of credi-
tor claims should be heard in federal courts or in state courts.8" Second, the
court reasoned that section 407(k)(1) granted general jurisdiction to hear
claims against the FSLIC in federal courts, but section 5(d)(6)(C) of the
HOLA limits the jurisdictional grant of section 407(k)(1) by prohibiting ju-
dicial interference with the exercise of the powers and functions of the
receiver. 89
The Baer court also rejected three constitutional challenges to FSLIC ad-
judications. The plaintiffs asserted that FSLIC adjudication violated article
III of the United States Constitution by placing adjudicatory powers in a
nonarticle III tribunal. 90 The court found this argument without merit be-
cause the FSLIC as receiver lacks the authority to render final judgments. 91
The court concluded, therefore, that agency determinations subject to judi-
cial review92 do not violate article III. 9' The court also dismissed arguments
85. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 74 (citing § 407(k)(1) of the NHA, 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1) (1982)). Section
407(k)(1) expressly vests federal courts with federal question jurisdiction over all actions in-
volving the FSLIC as receiver except those actions involving only questions of state law where
the state appoints the FSLIC as receiver of a state chartered thrift. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1)
(1982); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal question jurisdiction).
88. See Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 74.
89. Id. at 75.
90. Id. at 77. The plaintiffs relied on the Supreme Court plurality in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). According to the Baer
court, the Supreme Court has interpreted Northern Pipeline as only precluding Congress from
"vest[ing] in a non-article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue
binding orders in a traditional contract action under state law, without consent of the litigants,
and subject only to ordinary appellate review." Id. (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide, 573
U.S. 568, 585 (1985)).
91. Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 77.
92. The Baer court asserted that judicial review would be available under the APA. Id.
(citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982)). The court, however, failed to offer an opinion as to what
standard of review the courts would apply to the receiver's determination.
93. Id.
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that the procedures violated the plaintiffs' rights to a jury trial guaranteed by
the seventh amendment,94 and their due process rights provided by the
fifth95 and fourteenth96 amendments.
C. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International, Inc.
In Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International, Inc.,9 7 a consolidation of
five appeals arising from claims against the insolvent Westside Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit rejected the Hudspeth analysis.98 The Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded the dismissal of three of the five appeals, holding that section
5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA 99 did not divest courts of jurisdiction to entertain
creditor claims against insolvent thrifts. I°I
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that section 5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA' 01 re-
stricted the jurisdiction of the court only with respect to those powers or
functions explicitly derived from the statutes governing FSLIC opera-
tions.10 2 Because the court concluded that neither the statute nor FHLBB
regulations empowered the FSLIC to adjudicate claims, it found that section
5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA does not restrict a court's jurisdiction. 10 3 The
Ninth Circuit did not, however, completely reject the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies doctrine. ° The court remanded the cases to the district
courts with instructions to balance the agency's interests in maintaining an
efficient administrative system against the claimants' interests in seeking
redress.' 0 5
94. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (right to jury trial in civil suits). The court rejected the
plaintiffs' assertion of a right to a jury trial because it found the action to be against an agency
of the federal government; the FSLIC. Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 77. The court stated that long-
standing precedent excludes actions against the federal government from the seventh amend-
ment right to a jury trial. Id. (citing Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981)).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (due process rights).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (due process rights). The court rejected arguments that
adjudication by the FSLIC as an interested party violated plaintiffs' due process rights. Baer,
648 F. Supp. at 78. The court held that unless the plaintiffs show immediate harm or danger of
immediate harm in the administrative scheme, due process claims must await the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503-05 (1961)).
97. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nor. FSLIC v. Stevenson
Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451).
98. Id. at 1212.
99. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982); see also supra note 10.
100. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217.
101. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
102. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1223.
105. Id. The court recognized four valid agency interests. "The district court must bal-
ance the agency's interest in applying its expertise, correcting its own errors, making a proper
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The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion that the FSLIC lacks adjudicatory
powers on two arguments. First, traditional receivers lack the authority to
adjudicate claims.10 6 The court noted that the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), a receiver for insolvent banks, is regulated by stat-
utes' °7 similar to the FSLIC's. The FDIC as receiver had never asserted the
authority to adjudicate claims against insolvent banks.'0 8 According to the
court, the regulations permitting the receiver to disallow claims not proved
to its satisfaction" establish little more than the powers and functions of
traditional receivers. I"0 In the court's opinion, the receiver's rejection of a
claim does not rise to the level of adjudication"'. but merely informs the
claimant that the FSLIC refuses to recognize the claim's validity. Thus, the
FSLIC as receiver does not have the power to resolve the dispute with the
force of law.
Second, the Ninth Circuit also asserted that, by definition, the FSLIC's
power to "settle and compromise""' 2 claims is distinctly different from the
power to adjudicate claims." 3 The court reasoned that the power to adjudi-
cate eliminates the necessity of settlement and compromise." 4 Settlement
and compromise imply negotiation toward a nonjudicial resolution of a
claim between the two parties involved." 5 In contrast, adjudication denotes
the reliance on an independent third party to weigh the facts and apply the
findings of fact to principles of law and render a binding determination of
the rights and duties of the parties involved."l 6 The decision rendered
record, and maintaining an efficient, independent administrative system." Id. For a discussion
of the exhaustion doctrine, see generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 8.23-.31
(1984); Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from Environmental Cases, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1984-1985).
106. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217. The court distinguished the traditional receiver-
ship function of determining the priority of claims and distributing the assets from the adjudi-
cation of claims which "simply determines the existence and amount of claims that a receiver
is to honor." Id. (citing Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549 (1947)).
107. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982 & Supp. 1986); Na-
tional Bank Act, § 50, 12 U.S.C. §§ 191-194 (1982).
108. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218. But see Baer v. Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69, 76 (W.D.
Wash. 1986) (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC's) enabling statute lacks a
provision comparable to HOLA, § 5(d)(6)(C), which limits the court's jurisdiction to interfere
with the powers or functions of the receiver).
109. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4(b), 569a.8(b) (1987).
110. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217-18.
111. Id. at 1218.
112. NHA, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1246, 1259-60 (1934) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also supra note 4.
113. See Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1219.
114. Id.
115. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (5th ed. 1979) (compromise and settlement).
116. See id. at 39 (adjudication).
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through adjudication thus carries the force of law. 1 7 The court reasoned
that if the FSLIC as receiver had the power to reject a claim, it would have
little need to settle or compromise.' Therefore, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the language of the statute demonstrates Congress' intention that
the FSLIC defend creditor claims in court rather than adjudicate the claims
itself. 19
The FSLIC also argued that section 406(d) of the NHA 2 ° permits admin-
istrative adjudication because the statute states that the FSLIC may do all
things "necessary" for orderly liquidation. 2' The court rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning that the FSLIC overburdened the meaning of the word
"necessary" with its assertion of adjudicatory powers.' 22 The provision
merely authorizes the FSLIC to do all things necessary and within its ex-
press or implied powers to insure an orderly liquidation of the thrift. 23 The
Ninth Circuit determined that Congress never intended the FSLIC to adju-
dicate claims and, therefore, held that the FSLIC could not rely on section
406(d) of the NHA to create the power as necessary for orderly
liquidation. 124
The Ninth Circuit noted additional problems with the FSLIC's assertion
of adjudicatory authority. The HOLA contains several provisions granting
the FSLIC and the FHLBB adjudicatory authority over thrifts in their su-
pervisory capacities.' 2 The Act, however, does not confer similar adjudica-
tory authority to the FSLIC as receiver.1 26 The absence of such authority,
the court stated, is evidence that Congress did not intend to permit the
FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims. 127
The Ninth Circuit also expressed concern that FSLIC adjudication might
117. See Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1219.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. NHA, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1246, 1259-60 (1934) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also supra note 4.
121. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1219.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1219-20; see, e.g., 12 U.S.C § 1464(d)(2) (1982) (procedures for the issuance of
cease-and-desist orders); id. § 1464(d)(3) (1982) (procedures for issuance of temporary cease-
and-desist orders); id. § 1464(d)(4), (5) (1982) (procedures for removal of officers and directors
of a thrift); id. § 1464(d)(6) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (procedures for judicial review of appoint-
ment of a receiver or conservator). All administrative hearings called for in § 1464(d) are
conducted in accordance with the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7)(A) (1982).
126. Morrison-Knudsen. 811 F.2d at 1220.
127. See id.
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encroach upon the jurisdiction of article III courts. 2  The court found
plausible the argument that FSLIC's attempt to adjudicate creditors claims
violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 129 by representing an attempt to litigate private
rights.' 3° The Ninth Circuit, however, found it unnecessary to declare the
FSLIC's asserted adjudicatory authority unconstitutional under article III in
light of its holding that agency adjudication violated congressional intent. 131
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, concluded that the statutory schemes of the
NHA and the HOLA did not strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear creditor-
claims. Rather, courts should exercise discretion in determining whether to
dismiss or stay cases pending exhaustion of remedies or whether to proceed
to the merits of a case. 132 Thus, the Morrison-Knudsen decision differed
from the Hudspeth decision on two points. Under Hudspeth, courts may not
entertain any action until the claimant has exhausted all administrative rem-
edies, whereas the Morrison-Knudsen opinion holds that courts, in their dis-
cretion, may hold the courthouse door open to claimants prior to exhaustion
of remedies. The second impact of the Morrison-Knudsen holding provides
claimants with a de novo hearing to adjudicate claims upon exhausting ad-
ministrative remedies, unlike Hudspeth, where APA review procedures
apply. 133
The Morrison-Knudsen opinion overturned a long line of district court
cases in the Ninth Circuit which followed the Hudspeth approach. 134 The
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its Morrison-Knudsen decision in Murdock-SC As-
sociates v. Beverly Hills Savings & Loan Association, 135 reversing a lower
court's dismissal of a plaintiff's action to foreclose on a vendor's lien.' 36 The
Murdock-SC opinion deferred to the analysis in Morrison-Knudsen without
adding any new analysis.
128. Id. at 1221.
129. 458 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 259-62.
130. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221.
131. Id. at 1222.
132. Id. at 1223.
133. Although the Morrison-Knudsen court never explicitly stated that judicial review of
the receiver's determination would be de novo, this result follows from the court's holding that
the receiver lacks the authority to adjudicate creditor claims. Id. at 1212. Under the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation, the administrative process terminates prior to the adjudicatory pro-
cess. Id. at 1218. The claimant, therefore, would be entitled to de novo trial. See id.; see also
Homestead Say. v. Life Sav. of Am., No. 86 C 20,268, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1987).
134. See cases cited supra note 69.
135. 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom FSLIC v. Murdock-SC
Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-452).
136. Id.
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D. Lyons Savings & Loan Association v. Westside Bancorporation
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined, on
narrow grounds, to adopt the Morrison-Knudsen analysis. 137 In Lyons Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. Westside Bancorporation, 138 the petitioners con-
ceded the FSLIC's power to adjudicate claims and, therefore, never
presented the Morrison-Knudsen argument to the court. 13' The Seventh Cir-
cuit expressed its hesitation in approving one approach over the other with-
out the benefit of proper presentation of the issues. "
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit upheld a lower court decision that
adopted the Hudspeth approach.' 4' The court of appeals identified the regu-
lations governing FSLIC receivership powers and functions as the source of
the FSLIC's adjudicatory power. 142 The Seventh Circuit refused to invali-
date summarily such an important agency power authorized by longstanding
regulations. 43
The Seventh Circuit's acceptance of the FSLIC's adjudicatory powers pro-
vides little precedential value in light of the claimants' concession that the
FSLIC maintains exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate certain creditor
claims.'" The district courts within the Seventh Circuit disagree on Lyons'
precedential value. In Rigali v. Life Savings & Loan Association of
America, ' 45 the court interpreted Lyons as affirming the FSLIC's adjudica-
tory power. ' 46 The court failed to mention that the Seventh Circuit assumed
137. Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation. 828 F.2d 387, 395 (7th Cir.
1987).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 391. The court pointed out that, "at oral argument counsel for the [claimants]
repeatedly maintained that they were not challenging the FSLIC's exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims, but rather believed that their claim was distinguishable from those before
the Fifth Circuit in Hudspeth." Id. at 391 n.5.
140. Id. at 391-92.
141. Id. at 395. The district court reasoned that the legislative history of the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 89-695, § 101(a), 80 Stat. 1028 (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), indicated that Congress
intended to channel creditor claims against the receivership through the administrative pro-
cess. Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 576, 580 (N.D. I11.
1986) (citing H.R. REP. No. 2077, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1966)), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th
Cir. 1987).
142. Lyons, 828 F.2d at 392 ("[R]egulations have contained a provision for the adjudica-
tion of claims since 1956."); see also 21 Fed. Reg. 4548, 4553 (June 26, 1956) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 549.4 (1987)).
143. Lyons, 828 F.2d at 392.
144. Id. at 391 n.5.
145. No. 87 C 2543 (N.D. I11. June 16, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The
Rigali court inadvertently misnamed the Lyons opinion as "Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ala-
bama Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n." See id.
146. Id.
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that the FSLIC maintained exclusive jurisdiction only because of the failure
of the claimants to argue the issue.147
In contrast, the court in Homestead Savings v. Life Savings of America 148
noted that the Seventh Circuit failed to settle this issue and, therefore,
adopted the Morrison-Knudsen analysis that the regulations and statutes
failed to bestow adjudicatory power on the FSLIC. 149 The case involved the
FSLIC's attempt to overturn a judgment against Life Savings of America,
which was placed in receivership after the court issued the judgment.' 50 The
Homestead court argued that at some point the administrative procedure
ends and the adjudicative procedure begins.' 51 The court asserted, in dicta,
that the statutory and regulatory scheme requires creditors to present their
claims to the FSLIC for initial agency determination to pay, settle, or disal-
low the claims.' 52 According to the court, upon completion of this presenta-
tion process, the claimant may freely pursue adjudication of his claims in
court as a matter of general jurisdiction.153
In Homestead, where the trial and judgment preceded the appointment of
the receiver, presenting the claim to the FSLIC would serve no meaningful
purpose.' 54 The FSLIC subsequently settled with Homestead Savings and
withdrew its challenge to the district court's jurisdiction rather than suffer
from the adverse application of the Homestead rule.'55 The court agreed to
annul its ruling as a result of the FSLIC's decision to drop its challenge to
the court's jurisdiction.1 56
E. Post Morrison-Knudsen Opinions
With the advantage of the competing opinions in Hudspeth and Morrison-
Knudsen, several district courts, have addressed the issue of the FSLIC's
adjudicatory powers. None, however, has added substantial analysis to
either approach. Two district courts outside the Ninth Circuit' 57 adopted
147. Several other Seventh Circuit district courts also dismissed creditor claims against the
FSLIC as receiver for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., supra note 67.
148. No. 86 C 20,268 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1987).
149. Id. slip op. at 8.
150. Id. at 1-2.
151. See id. at 9.
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 9.
155. Weiner, FSLIC Accepts Judgment Against Bankrupt Thrift, Am. Banker, Dec. 8,
1987, at 14, col. 1.
156. Id. at 14, col. 2.
157. At the time of this writing, no Ninth Circuit district court opinion had been published
addressing the issue of the FSLIC's adjudicatory power over creditor claims.
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the Morrison-Knudsen analysis." 8 The district court in FSLIC v. Provo Ex-
celsior Ltd., 159 after restating the arguments made in Hudspeth and Morri-
son-Knudsen, adopted the Morrison-Knudsen analysis in holding that
Congress intended the FSLIC to serve as receiver, not adjudicator.'" ° Like-
wise, the district court in Homestead Savings v. Life Savings of America' 6 '
adopted the Morrison-Knudsen analysis. 1
62
One district court declined to adopt either the Hudspeth or the Morrison-
Knudsen approach. In Peninsula Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
FSLIC, 1 63 the court found that the claims against the thrift arose both prior
to the receivership and during the receivership." 6 The court held that the
administrative procedures could not address claims arising directly from the
actions of the receiver and, therefore, the court retained subject matter juris-
diction to address these claims.' 65  The court adopted, however, the Morri-
son-Knudsen criteria of exhaustion to determine whether the court should
exercise its discretion to permit the receiver to determine the validity of the
claims.1 66 Utilizing this criteria, the court refused to refer the claims to the
receiver for exhaustion of administrative remedies.16 7
Several district courts outside the Fifth Circuit preferred the analysis in
Hudspeth to that in Morrison-Knudsen. In FSLIC v. Florida 100 Develop-
ment Group, Inc., 168 the court relied on the Supreme Court opinion in
Katchen v. Landy,169 to uphold the FSLIC's adjudicatory powers. 170 The
158. See Homestead Say. v. Life Say. of Am., No. 86 C 20,268, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Ill. July
1, 1987); FSLIC v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., No. C86-0423G (D. Utah Apr. 24, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file).
159. No. C86-04238G (D. Utah Apr. 24, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
160. Id.
161. No. 86 C 20,268 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1987).
162. Id. slip op. at 8. See supra text accompanying notes 148-56 for the discussion of the
Homestead opinion.
163. 663 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
164. Id. at 509-10. The claimant in Peninsula alleged that after the FHLBB placed Sunrise
Savings & Loan Association in FSLIC receivership, the FSLIC, through its agents, renegoti-
ated the terms of a loan participation agreement. Id. at 507-08. The reorganized thrift subse-
quently failed, and the FSLIC sought to subject the claims arising from this renegotiated
agreement to the administrative claims process. Id.
165. Id. at 510-11.
166. Id.; see also Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir.
1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S.
Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451); supra note 105 (discussing the factors the court considers in its
determination to require exhaustion of administrative remedies).
167. Peninsula, 663 F. Supp. at 511.
168. 670 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
169. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
170. Florida 100 Dev. Group, 670 F. Supp. at 1582.
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Landy Court held that the Bankruptcy Act,"'7 authorizing bankruptcy refer-
ees to allow or disallow claims against a bankrupt estate, established an adju-
dicative procedure.' 72 The Florida 100 court held that "[u]nder this
authority, the FSLIC's process of proof, allowance and distribution is an
adjudicative process." '173 Other opinions merely relied on and reiterated the
analysis supplied by Hudspeth and its progeny in adopting the Hudspeth
approach. '74
II. RESOLVING THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS TO FSLIC
ADJUDICATION OF CREDITOR CLAIMS
The Morrison-Knudsen court identified two broad areas of conflict be-
tween its analysis of FSLIC adjudicatory powers and the Hudspeth analysis.
First, the Morrison-Knudsen court found insufficient statutory authority to
support the FSLIC's asserted power to adjudicate creditor claims. Second,
the Ninth Circuit noted that FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims impli-
cates potential constitutional limitations.
A. Receivership Powers and Functions
The FSLIC as receiver must derive its power to adjudicate creditor claims
against failed thrifts from express or implied provisions of its enabling stat-
ute. 175 The FSLIC's enabling statute expressly authorizes the FSLIC to do
all things necessary to liquidate the assets of a failed thrift in an orderly
manner, subject only to FHLBB regulation.' 76 Furthermore, Congress au-
thorized the FHLBB to draft rules and regulations governing the liquidation
of failed thrifts. 177
The FHLBB interpreted the HOLA and the NHA to include FSLIC adju-
dication of claims. Courts will give an agency's interpretation of its enabling
statute controlling weight unless the agency's regulations are arbitrary, ca-
171. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 2(a)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 842 (1938) (amended by 11 U.S.C.
§ 502 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
172. Landy, 382 U.S. at 329-30.
173. Florida 100 Dev. Group, 670 F. Supp. at 1582.
174. See, e.g., York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Pa. 1987);
Rigali v. Life Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Am., No. 87 C 2543 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Acquisition Corp. of Am. v. Sunrise Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 659 F.
Supp. 138, 140 (S.D. Fla. 1987); FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 658 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Utah 1987).
175. See 3 N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65.01 (Sands 4th
rev. ed. 1986).
176. NHA, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1246, 1259-60 (1934) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also supra note 4.
177. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(11) (1982).
19881
Catholic University Law Review
pricious, or manifestly contrary to its enabling statute."17 Thus, the determi-
nation of whether the FSLIC maintains the authority to adjudicate creditor
claims depends on whether the FHLBB's interpretation exceeds the statu-
tory authority Congress granted the FSLIC as receiver, and whether this
interpretation is reasonable and necessary to effectuate the policies of the
legislation.
The Morrison-Knudsen court held that neither the statute nor the FHLBB
regulations establish the FSLIC's power to adjudicate creditor claims.' 7 9
The court compared FSLIC receiverships to ordinary receiverships, noting
that the powers of ordinary receivers traditionally exclude the adjudication
of claims against the receivership.' The Ninth Circuit also compared the
FSLIC to the FDIC, asserting that the FDIC's enabling statute closely cor-
responded to the FSLIC's.' The court pointed out that the FDIC has
never asserted the authority to adjudicate creditor claims.'8 2
The Ninth Circuit, however, erred in comparing the FSLIC as receiver
with either ordinary receivers or the FDIC as receiver. Receivers derive
their powers from one of two sources. Ordinary common law receivers de-
rive their powers from the courts of equity. 8 3 At common law, a receiver
passed upon the validity of claims presented to him, and protected the assets
of the trust from questionable claims.'8 4 The receiver, however, allows or
disallows claims subject to the order of the appointing court of equity.' 85
The FSLIC is a statutory receiver. Statutory receivers derive their powers
from the express or implied statutory language creating the receivership.8 6
Thus, the express and implied provisions of the HOLA and the NHA define
the powers and functions of the FSLIC as receiver. As the Morrison-Knud-
sen court noted, neither the HOLA nor the NHA expressly authorizes the
178. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984); see also Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 828 F.2d 387, 391 (7th
Cir. 1987).
179. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215-17 (9th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed sub nom FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17,
1987) (No. 87-451).
180. Id. at 1217; see also 16 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 7813 (rev. perm. ed. 1979).
181. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218. But see Baer v. Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69, 76 (W.D.
Wash. 1986) (the FDIC's enabling statute lacks a provision comparable to the HOLA,
§ 5(d)(6)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982)); see also infra text accompanying notes 213-17
(discussing the effect of § 1464(d)(6)(C) on the court's jurisdiction).
182. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218, 1221.
183. 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 180, § 7665.
184. Id. § 7814.
185. Id.
186. Id. § 7813.
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FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims.1 87 The FSLIC as receiver relies upon
implicit congressional intent for its adjudicatory power.
Examining the legislative history of the various amendments to the
HOLA and the NHA reveals a statutory scheme that, over time, consistently
expanded FSLIC and FHLBB powers.1 88 Congress enacted these amend-
ments in an effort to preserve public confidence in the savings and loan in-
dustry by preserving the financial integrity of the FSLIC deposit insurance
fund. 189 The FHLBB and the FSLIC interpreted these amendments as im-
plicit congressional authorization for the FSLIC to adjudicate creditor
claims to effectuate the policies of these acts.
An examination of one of these amendments supports the FSLIC's propo-
sition that Congress intended to permit administrative adjudication of credi-
tor claims. In 1968, Congress enacted the Bank Protection Act of 1968
(BPA)19 ° in an effort to strengthen the financial integrity of the FSLIC. The
BPA extended the authority of the FHLBB to appoint and regulate the
FSLIC as receiver to state chartered thrifts.' 91 The Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency expressed its concern that several state chartered
thrifts experienced lengthy liquidations which tied up substantial portions of
the FSLIC's insurance fund for years. 192
The Committee expressed some concern over the scope of the powers the
187. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc. 811 F.2d 1209, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987), peti-
tion for cert. filed sub nom FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17,
1987) (No. 87-451).
188. See, e.g., Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat.
1028 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (expanding the authority of the
FHLBB to enjoin unsafe and unlawful practices); Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-389, § 6, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986))
(expanding the FHLBB's powers to appoint the FSLIC as receiver for state chartered thrifts);
Garn-St Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) (further expanding the FHLBB's powers to appoint the FSLIC as receiver for state
chartered thrifts); Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat.
552 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (expanding the FSLIC's powers to aid
troubled thrifts by purchasing assets and forcing mergers).
189. See S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2535.
190. Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)).
191. See id.
192. S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2536-37. When the FSLIC pays out insurance to depositors, the FSLIC
becomes a general creditor of the association to the extent of the insurance payout. Id. at 7,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2536. The FSLIC becomes the
single largest creditor, frequently entitled to more than 95% of the remaining assets due to the
FSLIC's subrogation of the deposits for which it paid out deposit insurance. See id. Delay in
the distribution of these assets places an inordinate burden on the FSLIC insurance fund. Id.
at 7-8, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2537.
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legislation granted to the FSLIC and the FHLBB, admonishing "the FSLIC
to give due consideration to the interest of all of the claimants upon the
assets of the association." 19 3 The Committee noted that the legislation
granted the FHLBB exclusive authority over the regulation of the FSLIC as
receiver.194 The Committee's warning implies either that the FSLIC should
not create a flood of litigation by unfairly denying creditor claims, or that
the Congress intended to grant the FSLIC the additional powers to adjudi-
cate claims against the receivership through administrative proceedings.
The caveat to treat creditors fairly would serve little useful purpose if
creditors could freely retreat to the courts to adjudicate their claims because
the FSLIC pays the litigation expenses out of the assets of the failed thrift.195
Because the FSLIC maintains a claim on 95% or more of the assets,1 96 the
FSLIC would have little reason to litigate well founded claims and every
reason to litigate unfounded ones. In addition, such litigation would delay
the distribution of the assets of the thrift, thereby tying up a substantial por-
tion of the FSLIC's insurance fund. Assuming the FSLIC acts in its own
interest, the FSLIC would litigate only questionable claims and approve
those that the courts would probably uphold. Thus, the Committee's ad-
monishment to the FSLIC to avoid unnecessary litigation serves no useful
purpose if the FSLIC acts in its own best interests, which are to preserve the
insurance fund.
Another interpretation of the Committee's warning suggests the Commit-
tee intended that the FSLIC establish an administrative adjudicatory proce-
dure to resolve creditor claims. The caveat maintains much more meaning
and force in this context than it would if FSLIC could only make a perfunc-
tory decision to allow a claim or litigate it. Furthermore, in admonishing
the FSLIC to treat the interests of the claimants fairly, the Committee noted
that section 5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA19 7 limits the jurisdiction of the courts
to interfere with the exercise of the FSLIC's powers and functions as re-
ceiver to those instances where the FHLBB invokes the court's
jurisdiction. 198
The Hudspeth court held that the FHLBB's regulations establishing an
administrative adjudicative procedure to resolve creditor claims furthers the
congressional intent to instill confidence in the thrift industry by promoting
193. Id. at 10, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2539.
194. Id.
195. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
196. See supra note 192.
197. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982); see also supra note 10.
198. S. REP. No. 1263, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2539.
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the financial integrity of the FSLIC insurance fund. 19 9 The court found the
FSLIC's assertion of adjudicatory authority consistent with Congress' intent
to enable the FSLIC to act expeditiously to liquidate insolvent thrifts.2"
The Morrison-Knudsen court rejected the Hudspeth assumption that the
FSLIC could act more expeditiously through administrative adjudication
than judicial adjudication.2 "1 The court asserted that judicial review of the
administrative determination itself could delay the liquidation process for
years, rendering illusory any perceived benefit administrative adjudication
would serve.2 °2 Congress expressly addressed the delays in judicial review
envisioned by the Morrison-Knudsen court in section 5(d)(7) of the
HOLA °3 and section 4080) of the NHA. 2° Congress intended these sec-
tions to provide for expedited judicial review of FHLBB and FSLIC actions
in federal circuit courts rather than in district courts. 20 5 The Morrison-
Knudsen decision would result in additional delays in the liquidation process
by permitting claimants the opportunity to initially present their claims to
the court for a determination of whether the claim should be presented to
the FSLIC or adjudicated in court. The Morrison-Knudsen result also would
add to the cost of the liquidation process by requiring the FSLIC to defend
the claims in a de novo trial rather than in a less expensive APA administra-
tive hearing. 2 6 FSLIC administrative adjudication, in light of the time and
costs associated with de novo review, appears reasonable and necessary to
effectuate the aims of the HOLA and the NHA. Therefore, courts should
defer to FSLIC adjudication.
The FSLIC's interpretation, however, is not supported by express lan-
guage in its enabling statute. The Morrison-Knudsen court rejected the
FSLIC's assertion of adjudicatory authority for this reason. The court
found the FSLIC's assertion of adjudicatory authority ultra vires in the ab-
sence of express congressional authorization. The court also rejected the as-
sertion that Congress implicitly authorized the FSLIC to adjudicate claims.
199. See North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1101-02 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
200. Id.
201. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed sub noma. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17,
1987) (No. 87-451).
202. Id.
203. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7) (1982).
204. Id. § 17300).
205. See S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3532, 3546.
206. See Gelpe, supra note 105, at 12 ("Probably, administrative resolution is less expen-
sive than judicial resolution because administrative proceedings are less formal ....").
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The Ninth Circuit relied on Morris v. Jones207 for the proposition that
adjudication of claims in the courts does not interfere with the functions and
powers of statutory receivers.2°8 In Morris, the Supreme Court rejected the
theory that the receivers appointed by authority of state statutes retained
exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims against the receivership. 2° The Court,
in Morris, held that a state may, through its police power, provide for exclu-
sive administrative adjudication of claims as long as such procedures do not
conflict with the Constitution.2 '0 The Morris Court found the state proce-
dures unconstitutional because the procedures failed to accord full faith and
credit to the adjudication of a claim by another state's courts.211 No such
infirmity affects FSLIC adjudication because it acts as a federal agency pur-
suant to congressional authority.212
The Ninth Circuit also compared the powers of the FSLIC to those of the
FDIC.2 13 In Baer v. Abel, 2 14 the court pointed out that the FDIC's enabling
statute lacks the functional equivalent of section 5(d)(6)(C) of the HOLA.215
Section 5(d)(6)(C) limits the court's jurisdiction to interfere with the powers
or functions of the FSLIC as receiver.216 Without this provision, the court
would retain discretionary jurisdiction to proceed with creditor claims,
notwithstanding FHLBB regulations establishing administrative procedures
to adjudicate creditor claims. Thus, the FSLIC could not maintain exclusive
jurisdiction to adjudicate creditor claims without section 5(d)(6)(C).217
207. 329 U.S. 545 (1947).
208. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing
Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549 (1947)), petition for cert. filed sub nora. FSLIC v. Stevenson
Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451).
209. 329 U.S. at 549.
210. Id. at 552-53.
211. 329 U.S. at 553. Denying enforcement of the sister states' adjudication violated the
full faith and credit clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
212. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause).
213. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc. 811 F.2d 1209, 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17,
1987) (No. 87-451).
214. 648 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
215. Id. at 76. The FDIC's enabling statute is the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The duties of the FDIC as receiver are defined
in the National Bank Act, § 50, 12 U.S.C. §§ 191-194 (1982). This Act explicitly authorizes
the FDIC as receiver to pay out, from the assets of the insolvent bank, the ratable portion of
any claim "proved to [its] satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction." 12
U.S.C. § 194 (1982) (emphasis added).
216. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
217. See First Am. Say. Bank v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp 93, 99
(W.D. Wash. 1986) ("12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982) removes all claims against the receivership to
a single forum, and 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982) effectively stays judicial action with re-
spect to those claims in any other forum.").
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Longstanding rules of statutory construction grant agencies great defer-
ence in interpreting their governing statutes.2"' FSLIC and FHLBB inter-
pretations of the statutes in question might well pass the arbitrary and
capricious standard of agency review21 9 given the overriding policy consider-
ations that led Congress to enact these statutes.
B. Compromise and Settlement
The Morrison-Knudsen court presented several additional arguments re-
butting the FSLIC's assertion of adjudicatory power. The court held that
the language of the statutes demonstrates that the FSLIC's interpretation
clearly violates congressional intent.22° The Ninth Circuit asserted that
Congress' express authorization of the FSLIC to compromise or settle
claims against insolvent thrifts22" ' implies that the FSLIC lacks the authority
to adjudicate claims.222 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the power to com-
promise and settle suggests a process of negotiation.223 The power to adjudi-
cate, however, denotes the much stronger authority to determine the merits
of claims with the force of law.224 The court held that such powers imply
that the FSLIC would pass on the merits of each claim as a judge, jury, and
party in interest.
In Homestead Savings v. Life Savings ofAmerica,225 the court agreed with
the Ninth Circuit in holding compromise and settlement inconsistent with
adjudication. 226 The court held that the claimant must exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies by presenting the claim to the receiver for an administrative
determination of whether FSLIC will negotiate a settlement of the claim or
disallow the claim.227 The court concluded that at this point, the adminis-
trative process ends and the adjudicative process begins.228
The Hudspeth court, however, never distinguished between compromise
and settlement, and adjudication because it viewed the FHLBB as the focal
218. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1987), peti-
tion for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17,
1987) (No. 87-451).
219. See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 844.
220. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1215.
221. NHA, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1246, 1259-60 (1934) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also supra note 4.
222. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1219-20.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. No. 86 C 20,268 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1987).
226. Id. slip op. at 8.
227. Id.
228. Id.
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
point.229 The court found the adjudication of claims reasonably necessary to
liquidate the failed thrift expeditiously and decisively. 230 Because the court
found it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the actions of the receiver ex-
cept at the instance of the FHLBB,2 3 1 the court reasoned that the FHLBB
had sole jurisdiction over the receivership.2 32 The Morrison-Knudsen court,
however, focused primarily on the portion of section 406(d) of the NHA 233
authorizing the FSLIC to settle or compromise claims without granting
much deference to Congress' directive for the FSLIC to do everything neces-
sary to liquidate the thrift in an orderly manner. The Morrison-Knudsen
court dismissed this directive, claiming that the FSLIC placed too much
weight on the meaning of "necessary., 2 3
4
Congress authorized the FSLIC as receiver to do all things necessary to
effectuate the liquidation of insolvent thrifts subject to the regulation of the
FHLBB.235 The FHLBB drafted rules and regulations concerning the con-
duct of receivers and conservators pursuant to its rulemaking authority in
HOLA, section 5(d)(11).236 A well-established principle of statutory con-
struction holds that an agency's expertise in determining what may be rea-
sonably necessary to effectuate the provisions of its enabling statute exceeds
that of the court.237 The FHLBB regulations authorize the FSLIC as re-
ceiver to pay claims allowed by the receiver or approved by the FHLBB.2 38
These regulations created an administrative adjudicatory process2 39 which
deserves deference from the courts.
The Morrison-Knudsen court acknowledged that these regulations pass
the arbitrary and capricious standard and recognized the validity of the reg-
229. See North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). The court concluded that the FSLIC derives its power to
adjudicate creditor claims from the regulations drafted by the FHLBB. Id. at 1102 n.5; see
also supra note 13.
230. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101.
231. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982); see also supra note 10.
232. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101.
233. NHA, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1246, 1259-60 (1934) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also supra note 4.
234. 811 F.2d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Steven-
son Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451).
235. NHA, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1246, 1259-60 (1934) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
236. Id. § 1464(d)(1 1).
237. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3255 (1986).
238. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4(d), 569a.8(d) (1987).
239. See North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1101 n.5 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); see also supra note 13.
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ulations. 24 The court refused, however, to concede that the regulations es-
tablished an adjudicatory procedure.241 Thus, the court substituted its own
interpretation of the FHLBB's regulations for that of the FSLIC and the
FHLBB, both of which clearly favored the FSLIC's assertion of adjudica-
tory powers.
Although the Morrison-Knudsen finding that compromise and settlement
are inconsistent with adjudication seems determinative at first glance, the
policy concerns behind the larger statutory scheme favor the FSLIC's asser-
tion of adjudicatory powers. The FSLIC's experience indicates that admin-
istrative adjudication facilitates the resolution of the vast majority of claims
to the satisfaction of the parties without need for judicial review.24 2 The
FSLIC's experience in effectuating statutory policies weighs heavily in favor
of its position.
C. The Amenability of the FSLIC as Receiver to Suit
The Morrison-Knudsen court maintained that FSLIC adjudication violates
clear congressional intent because the FSLIC's enabling statute provides ju-
risdiction in federal courts for suits by or against the FSLIC. 243 Further-
more, the statute exempts from federal question jurisdiction any suit against
the FSLIC as receiver or conservator for a state chartered thrift involving
issues controlled only by state law.2 " The Morrison-Knudsen court found
this provision to represent further evidence that Congress intended the
FSLIC to defend creditor claims in court.245 The court concluded that Con-
gress never intended to create a disparate situation, withholding court juris-
diction over federalized receiverships but permitting jurisdiction over state
receiverships.246
In Baer v. Abel,247 the court dismissed this argument 248 when it found
that NHA section 407(k)(1) 249 established a general grant of jurisdiction
which must overcome other provisions of the law.250 Section 5(d)(6)(C) of
240. 811 F.2d 1209, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Steven-
son Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451).
241. Id.
242. Brief for the FSLIC at 15-16, Zohdi v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. petition for
cert. filed Aug. 5, 1987) (No. 87-255).
243. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220-21; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1) (1982); supra
note 87.
244. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1) (1982).
245. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220.
246. Id. at 1220-21.
247. 648 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
248. Id. at 75.
249. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1) (1982).
250. 648 F. Supp. at 75.
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the HOLA25 establishes an independent limitation on the jurisdictional
grant of section 407(k)(1). The Baer court concluded that section 5(d)(6)(C)
requires all creditor claims to pass through the administrative process.
252
Section 407(k)(1), therefore, imposes no independent limitation on adminis-
trative adjudication.253
The Morrison-Knudsen decision reads too much into section 407(k)(1) in
support of its position that Congress intended the FSLIC to defend creditor
claims in court. The Morrison-Knudsen position directly conflicts with sec-
tion 5(d)(6)(C), which limits the jurisdiction of the court to hear certain
cases. Thus, section 5(d)(6)(C) imposes the duty on courts to dismiss claims
which section 407(k)(1) would otherwise permit. Section 407(k)(1) imparts
no additional insight into congressional intent or the validity of the FHLBB
regulations regarding the FSLIC's adjudicatory authority, nor does section
407(k)(1) impose any additional limitations on authority established
otherwise.
D. Constitutional Implications of FSLIC Adjudications
The FSLIC's assertion of adjudicatory powers must also pass constitu-
tional scrutiny. The courts have identified two constitutional issues which
appear to pose the greatest threat to the FSLIC's adjudicatory powers. The
first constitutional challenge to the FSLIC's adjudicatory power arises from
the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in all suits at common law.254 In
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,255
the United States Supreme Court held that Congress may commit the resolu-
tion of new statutory public rights to administrative adjudication without
infringing upon the seventh amendment.256 Statutory liquidation of an in-
solvent thrift, which converts the creditor's claim into a pro rata claim in the
thrift, may create a new public right which Congress could submit to the
FSLIC as receiver to adjudicate as a special court of equity without violating
the seventh amendment.257
The second challenge derives from article III of the Constitution which
requires vesting judicial power in judges granted life tenure.258 In Northern
251. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982); see also supra note 10.
252. 648 F. Supp. at 73-74.
253. Id.
254. U.S. CONST. amend VII.
255. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
256. Id. at 455.
257. See id. at 454; Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336 (1966) (Bankruptcy Code "con-
verts creditor's legal claims into an equitable claim to a pro rata share of the res").
258. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 259 the United States
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Bankruptcy Act of 197826 be-
cause Congress vested adjudicatory powers over private rights in non-article
III courts.2 6 ' The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, invalidated in
Northern Pipeline, included all actions related to cases arising under the
bankruptcy laws.2
62
The Supreme Court has established a balancing test to determine whether
a particular administrative scheme violates article 111.263 Among the factors
the Court weighed are the degree to which the nonarticle III tribunal as-
sumes the plenary powers of article III courts, the origins of the rights
sought to be adjudicated, and the concerns leading Congress to empower
nonarticle III tribunals. 26
The adjudicatory power the FSLIC asserts as receiver imposes far less on
the functions of article III courts than does the power asserted by bank-
ruptcy courts in Northern Pipeline. The FSLIC asserts only narrow adjudi-
catory authority over claims brought against the insolvent thrift and has
consistently brought claims asserted on behalf of the failed thrift to article
III courts for adjudication.26 5 The determination of the validity and amount
of claims against an insolvent thrift may plausibly involve matters of public
rights for which the limitations of article III do not apply. Thus, the limited
scope of FSLIC adjudications may impose minimally on the traditional pow-
ers of article III courts, thereby ensuring that administrative adjudication
remains within the Northern Pipeline restrictions.2 66
III. CONCLUSION
Three circuits have addressed the issue of whether the HOLA and the
NHA empower the FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims against insolvent
259. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
260. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I 1
U.S.C.).
261. 458 U.S. at 87.
262. Id. at 85.
263. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258 (1986).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Quality Inns, 650 F. Supp. 918, 919 (D.C. Md. 1987) (the FSLIC
brought action in federal court to recover receivership assets).
266. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to a case from the Fifth Circuit, agree-
ing to hear arguments on four issues discussed in this Comment: (1) whether the FSLIC
maintains the statutory authority to adjudicate creditor claims; (2) whether FSLIC adjudica-
tions comport with due process; (3) whether FSLIC adjudications violate the seventh amend-
ment right to a jury trial; and (4) whether FSLIC adjudication violates the article III
separation of powers principle articulated in Northern Pipeline. Coit Independence Joint Ven-
ture v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (No. 87-966).
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thrifts. The Fifth Circuit held that the statutory language restricting judicial
interference with the powers and functions of the FSLIC as receiver neces-
sarily denies the court jurisdiction to resolve creditor claims. The FHLBB
thus maintains exclusive jurisdiction over regulating the actions of the re-
ceiver and, therefore, appeals of FSLIC determinations must be routed
through the FHLBB prior to judicial review under the APA. The Seventh
Circuit concurred with the Fifth Circuit, finding that the claimant failed to
carry the burden of establishing the invalidity of the FSLIC's adjudicatory
powers.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
FSLIC's enabling statutes, holding such an interpretation "contrary to clear
congressional purposes., 2 67 Judicial resolution of creditor claims, according
to the court, would neither restrain nor adversely affect the FSLIC in the
performance of its receivership duties.
Viewing the HOLA and the NHA as a whole, Congress clearly intended
to preserve the confidence and stability of the savings and loan industry
through a financially sound FSLIC. The Hudspeth approach is the better
approach to implement legislative intent in light of the current problems
within the thrift industry. Because the industry depends upon a financially
sound FSLIC, the FSLIC must have the power to liquidate thrifts in the
most economical fashion, taking into account fairness to the shareholders,
depositors, creditors, and the FSLIC itself. Administrative adjudications
would expedite the liquidation process better than judicial adjudication be-
cause the former is less costly and more efficient than the latter. Claimants
still would retain the right to challenge agency adjudications through judi-
cial review under the APA, but only upon exhausting their administrative
remedies.
IV. ADDENDUM
Since the completion of this Comment in February, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in a Fifth Circuit case that challenged the FSLIC's adjudi-
catory authority on statutory and constitutional grounds.268 First, the petit-
itoner challenged the statutory basis of the FSLIC's asserted power, claiming
267. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1987), peti-
tion for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17,
1987) (No. 87-451).
268. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted sub nom. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. Mar. 7,
1988) (No. 87-996).
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that Congress substantively amended section 406(d) of the NHA 2 6 9 in 1986
due to the expiration of the Garn-St Germain provisions.2 7 ° The petitioner
asserted that the new language does not grant the FSLIC the exclusive right
to subject creditor claims to administrative adjudication. 27" Second, the pe-
tititoner asserted that administrative adjudication of creditor claims violates
article III of the Constitution by permitting nonarticle III courts to adjudi-
cate private rights.27 2 Third, the petitioner argued that administrative adju-
dication by the FSLIC violates the petitioner's right to a jury trial,
guaranteed by the seventh amendment to the Constitution.2 73 Finally, the
petitioner asserted that the administrative process violates due process rights
guaranteed by the fifth amendment.2 74 The Supreme Court agreed to hear
arguments on all four issues.275
This Comment has already addressed the petitioner's first three issues but
has not addressed the issue of whether FSLIC adjudication comports with
due process. The petitioner asserts that the FSLIC as receiver violates due
process by adjudicating claims in which it has a pecuniary interest.27 6 The
petitioner expresses concern that the FSLIC may place the financial stability
of the insurance fund ahead of the interests of claimants to the assets of
insolvent thrifts in adjudicating their claims.27 7
The petitioner's argument, however, overlooks the administrative reality
of the claims process. Although the receiver renders an initial determination
on the validity of a claim, the FHLBB reviews all aspects of the receiver's
determination de novo.278 Claimants continue to have the opportunity to
provide additional facts and legal arguments to the FHLBB for its review
after the receiver has issued its determination. 279 The FHLBB does not limit
269. Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1246, 1259-60 (1934) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
270. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
271. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC,
56 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (No. 87-996).
272. Id. at 17-18.
273. Id. at 20-21.
274. Id. at 18-19.
275. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted sub nom. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. Mar. 7,
1988) (No. 87-996).
276. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 56
U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (No. 87-996).
277. Id. at 18-19.
278. See Alex Tucker Dev. Corp., FHLBB Docket No. 87-187, slip. op. at 6 n.7 (FHLBB
Feb. 23, 1988).
279. See FHLBB, Procedures for the Processing and Determination of Administrative Ap-
peals from Decisions of the FSLIC as Receiver §§ II.B.3.(ii), at 3, H., at 6 (1987) (available
from FHLBB).
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its review to procedural issues, but renders its decision on the merits of the
claim.2"' Thus, the FHLBB, rather than the FSLIC, issues the final adjudi-
cation upon which judicial review will be based.2"' This system arguably
provides sufficient safeguards to fully vindicate claimants' rights.
Michael R. Maryn
280. Id. § II.E.
281. Id. § II.H.
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